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Abstract 
Evolutionary economics in the initial version of Nelson and Winter is 
concentrated on the analysis of the evolution of industries and markets 
and in that entrepreneurial innovation activities. But a theory of the firm 
beneath the level of the industry is not taken into account to a large extent. 
In order to widen its fundamental principles a resource-based, and as its 
extension, a knowledge-based view of the firm, both originated in the field 
of Business Strategy, are seen as promising candidates to close this gap 
within evolutionary economics. Industry dynamics as the evolution of a 
population of firms in this way is supplemented by a more detailed 
characterization of the internal structure of individual firms. It is the 
fundamental question with regard to the adequacy of an evolutionary 
interpretation of firm behaviour and development as to what extend a firm 
and its individual activities are considered to be capable of purposefully 
and actively influencing its environment, on the one hand, and are blindly 
selected by environmental pressure, on the other hand. In this way firms 
become intendedly heterogenous concerning market performance and 
organizational structure. Regarding the general topic of a theory of the 
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one being composed of technological, institutional and efficiency-based 
elements.  
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Fritz Rahmeyer 
1 Introduction  
One of the central subjects of evolutionary economics especially in the line 
of thought of Nelson and Winter, for their part - among others - based on 
Marshall and Schumpeter, is the analysis of entrepreneurial innovation 
activities and the evolution of markets and industries. But a theory of the 
individual firm beneath the level of the industry as a population of firms 
shows only fragmentarily. It is the object of this paper to reduce this gap 
and to lay more emphasis on the firm compared to the industry. To this 
end at first some necessary comments concerning the idea of evolution 
and its adequacy for economic reasoning are made (chapt. 2). After that 
alternative theories of the firm in the fields of industrial and institutional 
economics will be under careful scrutiny (chapt. 3). As the building block of 
an enlarged evolutionary theory of the firm a resource-based view in 
dynamic form presents itself. Knowledge, both as an input to and an 
output of production, is the most important resource and gives reason for a 
knowledge-based view of the firm (chapt. 4). The broadening of the 
currently existing behavioural evolutionary approach, resulting from 
findings of the field of Business Strategy, opens up a more active role to 
enable the firm to gain a sustained competitive advantage. In addition to 
that it leads to an intended heterogeneity among firms concerning market 
performance and internal organizational structure.  
2 Evolution in nature and society: fact, forms, theory 
Evolution as an endogenously emerging historical process denotes a 
mainly gradual and irreversible change of an organic or a socio-economic 
system, when compared to its initial state. In economic thought there is 
still no agreement concerning the content and adequacy of this idea and 
especially its theoretical foundation. For obvious reasons this concept may 
first of all be put forward in loose analogy to the neo-Darwinian theory of 
biological evolution. Reasoning by analogy is a method of scientific 
cognition and means the transfer of theoretical ideas between scientific 
disciplines in order to solve problems (see Cohen, 1993, p.13). Hereby a 
close transferability need not exist (see Niman, 1994, p.364; also Dosi and 
Nelson, 1994, p.155). Building blocks of a neo-Darwinian theory of 
evolution1 are the constrained emergence of variety among the individuals 
                                                          
1 For the origin of the synthetic evolutionary biology, see Mayr, 1984, pp.454; Depew 
and Weber, 1995, pp.299. 
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of a species, occurring undirected and by chance, their advantage or 
disadvantage concerning the survival and replication rate of genes by 
means of natural selection of organisms as the physical characteristic of 
an individual and the retention of those characteristics that are best 
adapted to the environment. Each individual in a population is unique, and 
when compared to the average, it will either be favoured or at a 
disadvantage (population thinking; see Mayr, 1984, pp.38). The result of 
the selection process is a directed change inside a population. It does not 
go off purposefully but opportunistically as well as coincidentally and does 
not lead to a perfect adaptation. So on the one hand evolution requires the 
emergence of diversity and in this way change, while on the other hand it 
destroys variety and gives rise to a directed and structured course. It is the 
result of a two-stage process, characterized by chance (creation of variety) 
and necessity (adaptation of individuals), so constituting a dynamic 
equilibrium between adapted individuals and their given environment. 
Predominantly it takes place by a gradual but not an erratic change of a 
population. Besides the emergence and natural selection of diversity 
among the units of a population a genetic evolutionary explanation also 
comprises the more regular development of the individual organisms in the 
population, the latter unlike the former dependent on the environment. 
From a historical point of view Darwin took up basic elements of English 
Political Economy for the formation of his theory of evolution, such as the 
law of population as a natural force and the idea of the division of labour in 
growing markets (see Schweber, 1985, pp.85). For him Classical Political 
Economy was a branch of evolutionary biology (see Depew and Weber, 
1995, p.2).  
To put forward a socio-economic theory of evolution, functional 
counterparts for all elements of biological evolution in the economic 
sphere must be found. For that, information, knowledge, behavioural rules 
as units of variation are looked upon analogously to a pool of genes which 
novelty flows into and which are selected for application and diffusion in 
the form of technical artefacts, production engeneering, entrepreneurial 
activities as phenotypes in firms and markets on a competitive basis. 
Selection takes place on various stages as a hierarchical process (see 
Mokyr, 1991, p.128). To generalize, it is the basic idea of a possible, albeit 
only weak, reasoning by analogy between biological and economic 
evolution, but going beyond merely speaking in images, that the origin, 
application and storage of scientific and technical knowledge, in this way 
giving rise to economic and organizational innovations and change, may 
be interpreted as a simultaneous endogenous process of the emergence 
and reduction of diversity, caused in the end by the need for the creation 
and combination of scarce productive resources. Economic evolution 
includes both change and regularity. So the explanation of the emergence, 
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selection and retention of human knowledge is in the forefront of 
evolutionary economics (see Hermann-Pillath, 2002, p.22). Economically 
usable knowledge has the properties of a public good. Its production is not 
given exogenously, but the result of invention and discovery as economic 
forces, whose returns must be appropriated as well as exploited (see 
Foray, 2004, p.14).  
Now, there are a considerable number of important differences between 
the biological theory of evolution and an evolutionary approach to 
economic change regarding the emergence and selection of variety as 
evolutionary mechanisms. To mention the most important ones: 
- Socio-economic novelties come into being not only by happenstance, 
but also to a high degree intentionally and for the purpose of altering 
the environment (see Winter, 1975, p.103; Ramstad, 1994, pp.84; 
McKelvey, 1996, p.23). But irrespective of purposeful human activities 
their result is mostly unknown. 
- Selection of economic variety within a population of individuals is the 
consequence of human activities, too (artificial selection). The 
respective units of variation and the environment interact with each 
other. An evolutionary theory may comprise “…,blind’ and ,deliberate’ 
processes…” (Nelson and Winter, 1982, p.11).  
- Technical and economic evolution runs faster and frequently more 
progressively than biological evolution. 
- Accumulated experience, knowledge, behavioural rules will be 
transmitted to the next generation.  
So socio-economic evolution takes place also or even above all in accor- 
dance with the model of Lamarck (see Nelson and Winter, 1982, p.11; 
Saviotti and Metcalfe, 1991, p.36). According to that theory, evolution is an 
exclusively vertical phenomenon, the continuous internal development of 
an organism or a technical artifact or product in the direction of a higher 
complexity and perfection in adaptation to environmental demands. At the 
same time the retention of acquired features passes to the next generation 
through transmission. Variety is the result of adaptation to the external 
environment, but for Darwin both a precondition and the result of variation 
and selection. For the reasons mentioned above Witt (i.a. 2001, p.48) 
pleads for the elaboration of a more generalized and independent, instead 
of a Neo-Darwinian, theory of evolution but whose focus of interest also 
are useful, unforeseeable economic and technical knowledge and 
innovations and their origin, dissemination and consequences.  
Despite these differences between biological and economic evolution 
concerning the dominant evolutionary modes of operation a comparable 
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causal structure for describing and explaining organic and socio-economic 
change is discernible. It exists in the theoretical conception of the 
emergence of variety in different forms, its reduction by competition and 
the retention of selected variety accompanied by the transmission of 
acquired characteristic features. A simultaneous result is the internal 
development of individual organisms (evolution and development). 
“Evolutionary theory is a manner of reasoning in its own right, quite 
independently of the use made of it by biologists…What matter are variety, 
selection and development - not the natural world” (Metcalfe, 2005, p.420). 
In addition, by self-organisation in the form of interactions between the 
units of analysis among themselves and with the environment new 
economic structures may emerge unpredictably, but without human design 
or government intervention. To summarize, economic evolution comprises 
both Darwinian and Lamarckian integral parts (see Fleck, 2000, p.265; 
Hodgson, 2001, p.114). For this view the term ‘Universal Darwinism’ (see 
Hodgson, 2002, pp.269) was coined,2 in which Neo-Darwinism is the more 
detailed theory also with a higher element of explanation (see Hodgson, 
2001, p.116; Knudsen, 2001, p.122).  
3 Survey of theories of the firm 
In an evolutionary, behaviourist view it is the purpose of a theory of the 
firm to describe and explain internal practices and activities in enterprises 
and on markets. Both are organized by rules and structures of business 
(see Schneider, 1997, p.55). Regarding the last ones, in addition to market 
structure, these contain all the capabilities, including the provision of 
resources, which offer an explanation for the heterogeneity between firms 
concerning their internal growth and their organization and strategy. (ibid., 
p.60; also Dosi and Marengo, 1994, pp.158). The courses of activities 
inside a firm concern its birth, existence and passing. Individual firms will 
affect these activities, relevant to scale and scope of production, carrying 
out of innovations, the internal restructuring of its organization, through 
their own unique efficiency. A theory of the firm in this way must explain 
the dissimilarities in the levels of success among enterprises (“why firms 
succeed or fail”; Porter, 1991, p.95). Simultaneously, the firm is a self-
contained and developing entity in its own environment by means of 
deliberately utilizing and building resources, while also being a part of the 
evolution of its population within an industry. At the level of the firm and 
the industry it is subjected to the pressure of internal and external 
selection, in its entirety or its separate activities. Both manifestations of 
                                                          
2  “… Darwinism includes not only specific theories that explain particular biological 
mechanisms, but also a general theory that applies to all open, complex and evolving 
systems, irrespective of the particular mechanisms of inheritance or replication”  
(Hodgson, 2002, p.273). 
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evolution, on different levels, happen at the same time (see Foss, 2001, 
pp.328; Rathe and Witt, 2001, p.337). From an evolutionary point of view 
there is no representative firm.  
Currently there is no unified theory of the firm, either in economics or in 
management strategy (see Garrouste and Saussier, 2005, p.194). 
Economics mainly deals with market performance and its determning 
factors, strategic management looks into allocation and coordination within 
the firm. Structuring competing theories, which give priority to different 
aspects of firms, in broad agreement with the literature, technological, 
institutional and efficiency-oriented theories are distinguished (see Winter, 
1988; Williamson, 1990b; Conner, 1991; Spulber, 1992; Chandler, 1992; 
Knudsen, 1995; Teece, Pisano and Shuen, 1997). They integrate 
characteristics of competitive markets, business strategies and 
organizational structures. The main dividing line exists between 
institutional and efficiency-oriented theories.  
3.1 Technological theories 
Among the technological theories there are the standard neoclassical 
theory and the one typical of industrial organization. In neoclassical theory 
the firm is characterized by its production and cost function. Subject to this 
restriction, it maximizes its profits in which it has complete information 
concerning supply and demand, resulting in the “optimal product-market 
price” (Kay, 1997, p.9). This expresses the optimum performance in 
decision making, exchange as its main field of activity, the market as the 
mode of coordination and prices as the only way of gaining competitive 
advantage. Firms exist to combine completely mobile and freely available 
factors of production and choose from among efficient production 
schemes. They all have access to the same knowledge of production. So 
the neoclassical theory of the firm represents a theory of market allocation, 
but not a detailed model of an individual firm (see Demsetz, 1988, p.143; 
Spulber, 1992, p.543).  
According to industrial economics, besides their production and cost 
function, and in that industrial structure, firms are also characterized by 
their competitive strategies (see Spulber, 1992, p.569). Their internal 
structure is again unspecified. Business or corporate profits result from 
determinants of market structure (industry effects), but not from the firm 
level (positioning effect). Including Porter's idea of the ‘competitive forces’, 
that builds a bridge between industrial organization and strategic 
management, both elements of market structure and market conduct, in 
the end preferences and production techniques, as well as competitive 
advantages at the firm level, have an effect on firm and market 
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performance. “A general model of strategic choice must include both 
environmental analyses (of threats and opportunities) and organizational 
analyses (of strengths and weaknesses)” (Barney, 1997, p.53). As the 
main criticism of the technology-oriented theories of the firm, the argument 
is raised regarding their predominantly static orientation and the 
inadequate consideration and processing of information and knowledge 
(for the latter see O'Brien, 1984, p.53). 
3.2 Institutional theories 
In an organizational or institutional view the purpose of a theory of the firm 
is to explain the existence and the boundaries of firms, also their internal 
organizational structure (see Holmstrom and Tirole 1989, p.65; also Foss, 
2005a, pp.24). Different approaches of these theories have the 
assumption in common that coordination of individual economic activities 
does not only take place on markets but also in enterprises as 
hierarchically structured organizations. In them the main subjects are 
contractual relations and incentive conflicts among the owners of 
productive factors and - as connecting link - property rights. In explanation, 
both asymmetric information, even uncertainty3 (Knightian view) just as 
bounded rationality, asset specifity and opportunism resulting in 
transaction costs (Coasian view) are taken for granted (see Rumelt, 
Schendel and Teece, 1991, pp.13; Foss 2000, pp.XXX). Knowledge about 
the manufacturing process is assumed to be the same for all firms, but not 
so regarding their internal organization. To this end, the shaping of 
institutional arrangements in organizations on a contractual basis for the 
efficient use of information and the protection of their overall performance 
is considered. Organizational problems are such of making a contract to 
manage internal relationships. In this connection economically relevant 
contracts are always incomplete. Especially the purchase of knowledge 
and entrepreneurial capabilities is not completely contractable (see 
Hodgson, 1988, p.183). Learning of individuals and organizations is 
neglected. The (ex ante) formation of incentive, control and information 
systems to guarantee the performance of the tasks of an agent in 
accordance with the principle, assuming asymmetric information before 
and after the making of a contract, is in the forefront. Technologically the 
firm is again looked upon as a production function. The competitive 
process is not taken into consideration.  
                                                          
3  Knight (1921, p.271) regards the existence of a firm as a result of “the reduction of the 
uncertainty in individual judgements and decisions” (p.293) that is shared between 
owners and employees.- Besides, a firm makes possible a greater flexibility in case of 
uncertainty than forming individual contracts between individuals on the market. In 
contrast to Knight, Coase (1937, p.407) is of the following opinion: “We can imagine a 
system where all advice or knowledge was bought as recquired.”  
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Transaction costs economics, as a part of institutional economics, works 
on the assumptions of bounded rationality, of opportunism of market 
competitors or contracting parties, and of asset specificity of exchange 
between the participants (see Williamson, 1990a, p.34). Contracts 
between competitors are necessarily incomplete because of limitations of 
knowledge and must be renegotiated continually. They must 
correspondingly allow for adaptation as new situations later arise (ex post 
consideration). To resist opportunistic behaviour after specific assets have 
been invested, the firm is organized as a governance structure (ibid., 
p.18), showing incentive and adaptation qualities. But it is not only a 
production or a cost function: “… governance is the means by which to 
infuse order, thereby to mitigate conflict and to realize…mutual gain from 
voluntary exchange” (Williamson, 2002, p.180). Firms and markets are 
alternative modes of the organisation of production and exchange. 
Consequently, they may be looked upon as adapting and reshaping 
organisations reacting to economize on transaction costs in a world of 
bounded rationality and incomplete information. The relative level of 
transaction costs determines the size and scope of a firm, thereby its 
boundaries. Compared with that the production process of a firm is not 
included in the consideration. Dynamic aspects such as learning and 
technical innovations are not taken into account concerning the decision in 
favour of markets or firms, too (see Hodgson, 1998, p.188). To 
summarize, in institutional theories nearly all problems of economic 
organization originate from conflicts resulting from individual incentives 
either in advance of drafting a contract or afterwards by organizing a 
governance structure (see Foss, 1999, p.732; 2005a, p.32). Neither theory 
comes with an answer regarding firm heterogeneity and a dynamic 
perspective on the boundaries of the firm, except for transaction costs.  
3.3 Efficiency-based theories 
Among this category of theories the static resource-based view of the firm 
and the advanced process-oriented “dynamic capability approach” are 
included (see Williamson, 1991, p.76; Teece, Pisano and Shuen 1997, 
p.510). The former is positioned by Barney (2001, p.644) against Porter’s 
approach of explaining competitive advantage in the tradition of Industrial 
Economics as the result of market power on product markets. Both 
variants contend that firms are not merely organizations characterized by 
a bundle of contracts or transactions. They mainly exist because they are 
looked at as being able to employ and build a bundle of specific resources 
and capabilities for their own use, in order to cope with economic and 
technical change and with uncertainty and to generate and also 
appropriate value. These will increase in the passage of the industrial 
process by means of knowledge and innovation activities. So internal 
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managerial activities, unlike external factors, the former resulting as well 
from interactions between firms, are taken into account to explain 
competitive advantage.4 The firm with its internal structure is a goal-
directed operating organization of common human activities, actively 
changing its environment, and also a social and historical unit. It is not 
only an entity capable of adapting to environmental influences (see Foss, 
1996, p.471). With regard to its available specific resources and both 
competences for their employment, among others organizational routines 
as vehicles of internal coordination and practical knowledge, the firm by its 
own decree will be lastingly heterogeneous, in contrast to its competitors. 
In the tradition of Marshall and Schumpeter, gradual as well as major 
innovation activities are the promoters of economic evolution. Following 
mainly Foss (1993, p.132; but also Hodgson, 1998, p.180; Foss, Knudsen 
and Montgomery, 1995, p.4), in particular the dynamic-capability approach 
may be categorized as a hitherto missing element of evolutionary 
economics. The focus of interest of an evolutionary theory of the firm in an 
ontogenetic, developmental reflection is the process of manufacturing, but 
not pure exchange, contractual relations or transaction costs, but first of all 
learning of individuals and organizations as a problem-solving activity, 
resulting in new knowledge and capabilities. Its central question from a 
business strategy point of view is: Why do efficient, successful firms differ 
in their own discretion (see Nelson, 1991, p.61; Dosi and Marengo, 1994, 
p.158; Carroll, 1993, pp.242)? Efficiency does not mean optimality of 
market performance but best possible interaction with and adaptation to 
the environment.  
New directions in alternative theories of the firm complement or even take 
the place of the “optimal product-market price” as the central category of 
the neoclassical theory. The following elements in various combinations 
are considered (see Kay, 1997, p.10): 
- bounded rationality and satisficing as alternative behavioural 
assumptions to optimization (Simon);  
- resources in factor markets instead of predominantly goods in product 
markets (Penrose); 
- firms and hybrid institutions as complementary institutional 
arrangements to markets (Coase, Williamson); 
- innovations instead of prices as the most important competitive activity 
(Schumpeter). 
                                                          
4  “…economizing is more fundamental than strategizing - or, put differently, that 
economy is the best strategy” (Williamson ,1991, p.76).  
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From this point of view, “...the firm...is a hierarchically organized collection 
of resources making imperfect decisions in which technological change is 
typically the critical strategic variable” (ibid., p. 29).  
4 Evolutionary approach to a theory of the firm 
4.1 Principles of a behavioural theory of the firm 
The subject of an evolutionary perspective in economics may be defined 
as describing and explaining endogenously, but also exogenously 
emerging, undetermined and irreversible technical, economic and 
organizational change, especially the creation and diffusion of new 
knowledge and technical innovations, and thereby also both the blind and 
guided genesis of variety and its as well purposeful selection on the 
market. Forces of persistence retain continuity in respect to which features 
will survive in the selection process (see Nelson, 1995, p.56). Besides, 
evolutionary change is seen also as the result of the self-organization of 
complex systems, market coordination for instance (see Witt, 1996, p.709; 
Foster and Metcalfe, 2001, p.2, 14).  
In contrast to the technological and institutional theories, evolutionary 
economics is directed to the real, observable behaviour of enterprises. In it 
the industrial process instead of exchange and contracting is at the center 
of attention. Firms, above all, are carriers of production techniques and 
productive knowledge. Knowledge about the manufacturing process is 
necessarily incomplete, unequally distributed and to be appropriated to a 
different degree. Concerning the behavioural rule of firms, the evolutionary 
approach refuses the assumption of optimality. Instead of conscious 
optimized decision making, Nelson and Winter (1982, p.15) on the basis of 
bounded rationality of the competitors work from the assumption of the 
rule-bound behaviour of routines to characterize the process “...of ,how 
things are done' in business firms and organizations more generally” 
(Winter, 1986, p.152; 1988, p.175). Inherently rigid “standard operating 
procedures” (Cyert and March, 1963, p.101), which are founded on past 
experience, serve as the basis for organizational routines (see Pierce, 
Boerner and Teece, 2002, pp.87). Their result is like that of intended 
rationality, long lasting and predictable. Besides, both authors use a non-
reductionist method of analysis, conceding enterprises as purposefully 
behaving organizations an independent importance, separated from the 
basic individual actors (“…individual behavior as a metaphor for 
organizational behavior…”; Nelson and Winter, 1982, p.72)5. In addition, 
                                                          
5  For a critique of this scientific approach that conflicts with methodological 
individualism, see Foss, 2003, pp.196. As he sees it, too little attention is devoted to 
individual decision making (p.198).  
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learning and the creation of knowledge is regarded as a social not only an 
individual process. 
The organizational routines of the firm for employing productive resources, 
comparable to skills of individuals, include its repetitive hierarchically 
structured behaviour in manufacturing, investment, search and innovation 
activities (see ibid., p.16; 73). In this, its knowledge, experience and 
competence regarding both production and organization that to a high 
degree are of a local and specific nature are accumulated. Routines create 
continuity and reinforce the internal stability of the firm (see Winter, 1975, 
p.101). They do not have to result in optimal outcomes but they are 
adapted to the respective environment.6 In the view of Nelson and Winter 
(1982, p.14) organizational routines are comparable to genes as units of 
variation in nature, as much as firms to organisms as their phenotypes. 
The frequency of successful routines will increase as a result both of the 
(external) selection process within a population of firms and within the 
individual firm over the period of its development, the latter being of a 
more purposeful kind. Intended and problem-oriented processes of 
learning and searching, to be directed at seeking profits, that occur 
cumulatively and path-dependently, based on failures in the past, can 
change behavioural routines gradually and with some delay. The 
introduction of technical and organizational innovations into the market 
intend to improve the adaptability of firms in case of an unsatisfactory 
market performance and to open up new activities (for the latter, see 
Winter, 1975, p.105; Witt, 1996, p.712). In contrast to optimal adaptation in 
this way a variety of routines of firms will occur, driving evolutionary 
change (see Metcalfe, 1995, p.471). Corresponding to their specific 
routines, firms will differ for efficiency reasons in the level of unit costs and 
profits. A modification of routines impedes the transmission and retention 
of invariable rules, with that being in conflict with evolution in nature. 
Thereby the explanation of stability and persistence of firm behaviour will 
also be affected. In this evolutionary understanding firms in the end are 
regarded as knowledge-based organizations capable of learning and 
transformation, or even as “repositories of productive knowledge” (Winter, 
1988, p.175). They are in their entirety or their individual essential parts 
such as routines, resources (see Aldrich, 1999, p.40) subject to selection 
on the market and also show an, although not regular, internal path of 
development. Undeniable, besides their routine and learning activities the 
persistent profitability of enterprises also depends on their internal 
organization, for instance the existing control and incentive mechanisms, 
                                                          
6  “…no such thing as a universal best practice can possibly exist. There can only be 
local ,best’ solutions” (Becker, 2004, p.652).  
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in that way giving rise to transaction costs (see Vromen, 1995, p.109), as 
“the institutional structure of production” (so Coase, 1988, p.47).7  
4.2 Resource-based view of the firm 
In broadening the basic behavioural approach of evolutionary economics 
for information of management theories concerning business strategy, 
firms will be characterized through three relatively stable attributes (see 
Nelson, 1991, p.67; 1994, p.233). They may increasingly lead to intended, 
chosen permanent inter- and intra-industrial heterogeneity regarding their 
market performance and the provision of resources. These attributes are, 
first, their market strategy and internal organizational structure, and, 
second, their specific competences and capabilities, particularly for 
utilizing and for creating scarce productive resources and carrying out 
innovation activities as central parts of corporate and competitive strategy. 
Resources must be selected, capabilities be built (so Makadog, 2001, 
p.389).  
Strategy comprises the long-term objects of an enterprise and its incurred 
commitments, based on its given internal resources.8 Structure includes 
the organization of a firm with regard to its environment to achieve its 
objects. Both elements decide what the core competences of a firm are 
referring mainly to technology and production in order to obtain sustained 
competitive advantage. They change only slowly as a consequence of 
bounded rationality and its given hierarchy of routines.  
The capabilities of an enterprise for the formation and growth of resources 
and its competences for their deployment supplement and above all 
modify its operating routine activities. They are regarded as a “higher-level 
routine” (Winter, 2003, p.991). Thereby they serve as a basis for the 
deliberate development of successful that is value creating strategies. 
“…the capabilities discussion provides a bridge between the 
predominantly descriptive concerns of evolutionary theory and the 
prescriptive analysis of firm strategy” (Dosi, Nelson and Winter, 2000, 
p.12). Capabilities and competences, also the decision-making rules, 
determine the competitive strength of a firm (see Dosi and Teece, 1998, 
p.301). They arise from cumulative entrepreneurial search, learning and 
innovation processes, also of knowledge transmission. Like routines they 
are characterized by continuity and delayed change.  
                                                          
7  “The fact that incentives are not taken into account is a drawback shared by all the 
evolutionary theories of the firm” (Garrouste and Saussier, 2005, p.186). 
8 Following Porter (1991, p.102), the firm is regarded as a bundle of activities, aiming at 
its adaptation to the environment and also their formation. The shaping of a market 
strategy will occur on the basis of the available provision of resources that is assumed 
to be equal for all firms (see also Spanos and Lioukas, 2001, pp.908).  
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In this broadening of the basic behavioural model, the firm, following 
Penrose (1959, pp. 24), is looked upon as a bundle of productive physical 
and human resources (stocks), capable of internal development, whose 
produced heterogeneous results (flows) are able to be used for 
manufacturing purposes in different ways. The unique bundles of 
resources and services, coordinated by means of administrative decision 
making, thus the resource company's management, create its capabilities. 
“The business firm…is both an administrative organization and a collection 
of productive resources” (ibid., p.31). These for their part induce the 
productive output of the resources (ibid., p.78). Learning in the course of 
the manufacturing process will result in persistent corporate growth, and, 
in this way, extends the capabilities of the firm concerning manufacturing 
and organization. Corporate growth will result in surplus firm-specific 
resources, for instance human capital as a result of its growing 
experience, for which no efficient market exists. They make possible an 
expansion of production in previous and in new business activities, which 
on their part again lead to innovations in knowledge and resources in 
enterprises. As a consequence of the indivisibility of productive factors, the 
different possible uses and the new development of resources and 
productive services, a firm will not be able to attain a state of long-term 
equilibrium. To sum up, resources may be defined as specific productive 
factors, obtained in markets, modified and refined through the ability of the 
company's management, employees or external specialists into 
characteristic features of the firm for the purpose of its competitiveness 
(see Schneider, 1997, pp.60 ).9 
So firms, in the form of their provision of resources as input factors which 
are valuable and in short supply and the supply of services, show qualities 
of both coherence and heterogeneity. Their existence, also their horizontal 
and vertical boundaries, may be justified as an aggregation of such basic 
units (bundle of routines, pool of resources, nexus of contracts), for which 
an internal organization compared to market coordination produces a 
comparative advantage with regard to generating individual skills, 
organizational routines, valuable resources, thereby at last competitive 
advantages compared with rivals (see Williamson, 1999, p.1096; 
Granstrand, 1998, p.467; Madhok, 2002, p.536). As their individual types, 
tangible, physical and also intangible resources, such as human capital, 
technical knowledge as well organizational resources, for example 
corporate management, are distinguished (see Barney, 1991, p.101; 
Bamberger and Wrona, 1996, p.132). The former are subject to wear, the 
                                                          
9  But there is not yet a unified definition of what resources, also capabilities, exactly are. 
See for that critique Duschek, 2002, p.50; Bromiley and Fleming, 2002, p.329. - 
Teece, Pisano and Shuen (1997, p.516) prefer the term “firm specific assets” instead 
of resources.  
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latter as a result of indivisibilities show a partly unlimited usage, via 
appropriation and exploitation through individuals and organizations, 
perhaps. Increasing returns in use again result in path-dependency. In 
contrast to tradable productive input factors, resources are not completely 
movable and so show less value in any different use.They are difficult to 
imitate and substitute or not at all. Due to incomplete information their 
expected value for a firm exceeds their market price. In addition, they can 
be protected against rivals by creating limits to competition (also called 
“isolating mechanisms”; Rumelt, 1984, p.567) comparable to barriers to 
entry (for characteristics of resources see Barney, 1991, pp.105; Peteraf, 
1993, pp.180). The sort of resources to be employed arises out of their 
competitive environment in product markets. In this functional definition 
firms are interpreted as “integrated clusters of core competencies” for the 
coherent employment of resources (see Teece et al., 1994, p.23; Dosi and 
Teece, 1998, p.296). They exist beyond market structure and competitive 
strategies. 
A qualitatively different and scarce supply of valuable resources gives 
reason for a permanent (Ricardian) efficiency rent. Firms at the same time 
have to absorb the generated rent and to convert it by investment activities 
into internal growth (fitness). The effect may be an increase in size and 
market share possessed by successful firms. Not all firms of a population 
need to behave uniformly concerning their fitness in the form of internal 
growth and financing of innovations, if they are not able to realize and use 
their available opportunities equally. The relative position of a firm inside 
its industry (firm characteristics) gains in importance in explaining the 
relative corporate success compared with the attractiveness of the 
industry as a whole or its environment (industry characteristics). So the 
resource- or efficiency-based approach must more likely be categorized as 
a complement than exclusively a substitute for the firm of industrial 
economics (see Conner, 1991, p.143; Bamberger and Wrona, 1996, 
p.141; Henderson and Mitchell, 1997, pp.11). That is why in its static 
version it disregards the environment as well as the internal organization 
of an enterprise. Both the internal strengths and weaknesses of a firm and 
its external threats and opportunities of the product and factor markets 
simultaneously determine corporate success, and not only the supply of 
resources or the environment. Altogether, the resource- or efficiency-
based view assigns a more active role to firms than only the adaptation to 
a given environment or its change. In this way it broadens the original 
behavioural theory of the firm.  
The resource-based view starts at a given different provision of 
heterogeneous and imperfectly mobile resources of firms. It comparatively 
neglects to explain how new resources are created and already existing 
ones integrated, with that how the resource base is broadened (so called 
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“dynamic capabilities”; see Teece, Pisano and Shuen 1997, p.510; 
Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000, p.1107; Spanos and Lioukas, 2001, p.924). 
It also remains open, as to which way the intra-industrial heterogeneity 
among firms with regard to the initial accumulation of valuable resources 
will happen (see Noda and Collis 2001, p.899). If the personal knowledge 
of individuals and the collective knowledge of organizations, the latter 
being stored in their technologies and management as their carrier 
(“…organizations know more than what their contracts can say.” Kogut 
and Zander, 1992, p.383) is looked at as the central resource to improve 
decision making and also the internal control of enterprises, then its 
creation, application and dissemination is the most important task of the 
firm and its management resources (see Mahoney, 1995, p.97). Technical 
and organizational knowledge is especially applied in transforming 
tangible input into the production of goods. Equally it leads to competence- 
and capability-building and therefore is a prerequisite for generating, 
extending and using a bundle of resources. Merely insignificant 
differences among firms concerning their adopted strategy and their 
market conditions may increase as the result of diverging, self-reinforcing 
interactions, for instance increasing returns in production and use, or of 
local learning and experience, not only differently efficient resources. 
Converging forces of imitating corporate success and management 
decisions may influence the pursued path of a firm and reduce differences 
in its development. The emergence of knowledge, techniques, rules set off 
both by external factors like new scientific discoveries and by internal 
learning, the valuation of technical artefacts, products, organizations and 
their activities by external as well as internal selection, together with 
retention and diffusion of confirmed new knowledge and more effective 
routines and capabilities, describe an evolutionary process of knowledge 
creation and transmission (for that see Zollo and Winter, 2002, pp.343). 
The newly created knowledge contributes to the necessary diversity for 
the continuation of the evolutionary process.10 In terms of March (1991, 
p.71), the growth of knowledge and thereby technical innovations are the 
result of a balance “…between the exploration of new possibilities and the 
exploitation of old certainties.” Both activities compete for resources so 
that a balance between them must be found according to the intention of a 
firm. Penrose’s theory of firm growth may be looked at as an attempt to 
show regularities in the internal development of a firm. Unlike the static 
resource-based approach, following the dynamic capability view, the 
persistent success of firms also depends on their interrelation with the 
environment, for instance their technological opportunities and 
appropriability requirements, not exclusively internal conditions. But 
                                                          
10  “…the growth of our knowledge is the result of a process closely resembling what 
Darwin called ‘natural selection’; that is, the natural selection of hypotheses…” 
(Popper, 1972, p.261).  
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transaction costs resulting from activities concerning the formation and 
employment of resources, also the appropriation and protection of their 
created rent, are not included in the analysis (see Foss 2005a, pp.103; 
2005b, p.549). At the end, economic, technological and organizational 
evolution is both the result of an unintentionally occurring market selection 
by environmental pressure and of voluntary, purposeful entrepreneurial 
activities, which are founded on acquired knowledge (see Vanberg, 1996, 
p.693). To speak with Winter (1995, p.151): “It is in addressing the 
dynamics of resource exploitation that one finds the strongest 
complementarities between the resource-based view and evolutionary 
economics…” 
4.3 Knowledge-based view of the firm 
In this interpretation as a knowledge-generating, -integrating and -using 
organisation the activities of a firm aside from coordination, are 
characterized also by learning, innovation and organizational change as a 
dynamic process (see Eliasson, 1994, p.179). These reproduce and raise 
its knowledge level, intentionally and deliberately, accompanied by 
mistakes and costs, and replace in evolutionary reasoning the optimization 
of resource allocation in the technology-oriented theories of the firm. 
Learning and production of knowledge happen in different organizational 
ways. Firstly, internal to the firm through scientific research and 
development and the following innovation of new products and 
manufacturing processes (R&D competition), but also through gaining 
experience on the part of employees in manufacturing (doing, using). 
Secondly, through the purchase and commercial use of external 
knowledge from the science and technology sectors, i.e. universities or 
research laboratories, or from rivals or customers and suppliers, for 
instance by means of reverse engineering, fluctuation of R&D personnel, 
or from R&D cooperation with competing firms in different forms (see 
Malerba, 1992, pp.847; Antonelli, 1999, p.247). The common pool of 
knowledge will increase in this way and serve as a basis for positive 
externalities for further creating and exploiting knowledge.  
Internal and external sources of knowledge are complementary to each 
other. Internally created knowledge and its dissemination inside the firm 
will not cause transaction costs to the same extent than purchasing 
external knowledge. Knowledge transfer between firms is an especially 
important reason for incomplete contracts. Furthermore, the acquisition 
and use of the mostly product- and firm-specific knowledge from learning 
and experience is made available to a greater extent, than in the case of 
technical knowledge acquired through formal R&D activities. This is of a 
more public nature, and to an even greater degree, more difficult to 
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appropriate. Positive externalities of this latter kind of knowledge are 
abundant, acting in this way as an incentive to cooperate with rivals. In 
consequence patent protection to acquire property rights may decrease in 
importance, compared to gaining lead time and secrecy (see Lewin et al., 
1987, pp.793). In case of an at least partial exclusion of the proceeds of 
knowledge production temporary (Schumpeterian) monopoly quasi-rents 
will arise (see Peteraf, 1993, pp.180) and render possible the financing of 
R&D expenditures. Knowledge and innovations emerge as a result both of 
market incentives and technological opportunities. Against that, the huge 
amounts of costs of R&D investments and the uncertainty regarding their 
technical and economic results, will bring disadvantages as well. From a 
management point of view this gives reason for a participation in different 
forms of research cooperation to get access to external resources. But the 
acquisition and utilization of external knowledge requires an ‘absorptive 
capacity’ of the recipient firms, based on accumulated knowledge in the 
past and resulting from their own learning and research activities (see 
Cohen and Levinthal, 1990, p.128). As a result, the production of 
knowledge and innovations are not an individual entrepreneurial activity, 
but more and more often has become a collective and specialized 
process, in that a multitude of private and public contributors are involved, 
who interact positively by means of both creation and exploitation of 
spillover effects (see Pyka, 1999, pp.71).  
In addition, knowledge consists both in a more tacit, implicit and a more 
codified, explicit form. The former is stored in individuals and organizations 
and is especially the result of experience, not formalized and hardly trans- 
ferable in and among enterprises. Its proceeds are able to be privately 
appropriated to a high degree, so that enterprises have a common know- 
ledge base. Explicit knowledge is stored in codebooks, patents, and 
computer software and is more easily divisible and exchangeable (see 
Grant, 1996, pp.111; Antonelli, 1999, pp.244; Argote, 1999, pp.71). The 
codification of knowledge is the result of an economic decision concerning 
its costs and benefits, but not of inherent characteristic features of the 
different forms of knowledge (see Cowan, David and Foray, 2000, 
pp.240). The possibility of appropriating implicit, often also localized 
knowledge will diminish in the course of the life cycle of a technology. At 
the same time its chances of codification and its more even distribution 
among firms will increase (see Saviotti, 1998, p.850).  
By combining the different sources and forms of learning and knowledge, 
the following possibilities of differentiating knowledge in firms will arise 
(see Antonelli, 1999, p.245):  
- internal implicit knowledge, obtained especially through realization of 
practical experience (learning, using); 
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- external implicit knowledge, through appropriation from the collective 
innovation system; 
- internal explicit knowledge, as a result of in-house research and deve- 
lopment activities; 
- external explicit knowledge, required from formal R&D cooperation.  
These individual kinds of knowledge complement one another, too. 
Enterprises, according to industries and the attained phase of the life cycle 
of their products, are integrated into a network of internal and external 
knowledge with resulting spillover-effects. Nonaka and Takeuchi (1997, 
p.74) give priority to the creation and extension of knowledge by 
articulatating implicit knowledge in an explicit form, what they call 
‘externalization’. Different forms of scattered productive knowledge can be 
integrated and utilized inside a firm more efficiently than by contracting 
between individuals on the market, especially in the case of tacit 
knowledge. So a reason for its existence is provided (see Demsetz 1988, 
p.157; Grant, 2003, p.208; Foss, 2005 a, pp.37). “…we proposed that a 
firm be understood as a social community specializing in the speed and 
efficiency in the creation and transfer of knowledge” (Kogut and Zander, 
1996, p.503). An increasing specialization and distribution of knowledge 
supports the emergence of cooperation between them. Because of this, 
the horizontal and vertical boundaries of a firm will be increasingly blurred. 
But as a consequence of opportunistic behaviour concerning the 
necessary disclosure of its own research activities, cooperation may not 
be stable.  
Firms with their individual activities differ from each other with regard to 
their sources and processing of information and productive knowledge. 
Also for this reason they show a technical and organizational diversity, 
according to their technological path taken, their level of unit production 
costs, the different capabilities in converting new knowledge into new 
organizational routines, innovations and internal growth. They develop 
internally, as regards their resources and capabilities, on the basis of their 
business strategy,11 and they or their individual activities are subject to 
selection in the competitive market place. As a result both market and 
organizational structure will permanently alter.  
Following the dynamic capability, knowledge-based view, the firm, aside 
from being a pure ‘exchange structure’ to impose incentives and control on 
individuals internally, is a social, knowledge-creating and knowledge-
applying ‘productive unit’ (for this distinction see Knudsen, 1995, p.214; 
                                                          
11  For a life cycle model of business organization emphasizing the role of the 
entrepreneur who is constrained by his/her flexible ‘business conception’, see Witt, 
2000, pp. 736. 
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also Spulber, 1992, p.566; Langlois and Foss, 1999, p.213). It coordinates 
and integrates dispersed and specialized knowledge regarding the 
employment of resources of different participants and in different forms 
(see Hayek, 1945, pp.519) and on this basis can simultaneously create 
new knowledge. This applies to all activities of the firm. Knowledge is 
stored and accumulated in individual persons and with that in 
organizations with their hierarchically structured routines and capabilities. 
Together with its stock of knowledge and its capabilities also the 
organizational structure of the firm must evolve. So the evolutionary 
dynamic capability approach of developing and using knowledge and 
resources in an integrated way includes the production process and the 
organizational structure of an enterprise, requiring an integration of 
theories of Organizational Economics and Strategy Research like the 
resource- and the knowledge-based view of the firm (see Foss, 2005a, 
pp.50). In that way it may contribute to both the explanation of internal firm 
organization and its strategy to resist competitive pressure and to attain 
sustained competitive advantage.  
5 Concluding Remarks 
The relation between evolutionary economics and Business Strategy in 
the version of a resource-based and a dynamic-capability view of the firm 
may be looked at from two different starting points. On the one hand 
evolutionary economics is intended for the broadening of the static 
resource-based approach towards a behavioural, process-oriented variant, 
in this way to explain the creation of new resources and capabilities for 
their use. On the other hand the resource-based and especially its 
extension in form of the knowledge-based view are a promising candidate 
in order to close a gap within the framework of evolutionary economics. In 
this way industry dynamics as the evolution of a population of firms is 
supplemented by a more detailed characterization and the development of 
individual firms. This second approach is looked into here. The 
heterogeneity of firms as the result of rent-generating resources, first and 
foremost knowledge, is emphasized. Knowledge is created, intentionally 
and blindly, converted into innovations which are subjected to the 
selection pressure of the market, but are also adaptable to changes in its 
environment. Confirmed productive knowledge is preserved and grows in 
the course of evolution. By considering the internal conditions of success, 
such as resources and capabilities, in addition to their routines, 
evolutionary economics will be completed by normative aspects of 
strategic management. But, all in all, neither the emergence of rent-
generating activities is explained as yet in an entirely satisfactory manner 
nor will a unified theory of the firm be constructed, but more likely a hybrid 
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one being composed of different technological, institutional, and efficiency-
based elements. 
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